Double Dividend in an Endogenous Growth Model With Pollution and Abatement by Esther Fernández Casillas et al.
Double Dividend in an Endogenous Growth Model
With Pollution and Abatement
Esther Fernández Casillas
Departamento Fundamentos Análisis Económico II
Universidad Complutense
28223 Madrid
Rafaela Mª Pérez Sánchez








This paper discusses wether by implementing an environmental tax reform, a
government may achieve a double dividend. We consider the simplest endogenous
growth model (AK model) and include a negative environmental externality in the
utility function. Pollution flow can be reduced by means of private abatenment
activities. There is a predetermined non-optimal level of public spending financed by
environmental taxes and pre-existing taxes on income and consumption. The major
contribution of the paper is to show that, under this simple framework, a double
dividend may arise if tax reform consists of substituing environmental tax for income
tax, in such a way that the government budget constraint holds in a present value sense.
RESUMEN
En este artículo se estudia si el gobierno puede obtener un dividendo doble a través de
una reforma impositiva medioambiental. Consideramos el modelo de crecimiento
endógeno más simple (modelo AK) e incluimos una externalidad medioambiental
negativa en la función de utilidad. El flujo de contaminación puede reducirse mediante
actividades privadas de abatement. Hay un nivel no óptimo predeterminado de gasto
público financiado con impuestos medioambientales e impuestos sobre la renta y el
consumo. La mayor contribución del artículo es demostrar que, en este sencillo
contexto, puede aparecer un dividendo doble si la reforma sustituye impuestos sobre la
renta por impuestos medioambientales, de forma tal que la restricción presupuestaria del
gobierno se mantenga en valor presente.
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A revenue neutral green tax reform involves introducing or increasing an
environmentally oriented tax and using the revenues to ﬁnance reductions
in pre-existing distorsionary taxes. Thus, environmental taxes seem to be
an attractive instrument to potentially enhance environmental quality with-
out damaging economic growth. An environmental tax reform will yield a
double dividend if it is able to achieve a cleaner environment and a less
distortionary tax system, leading to an increase in welfare from environ-
mental amenities (so-called green dividend) and from private commodities
(so-called blue dividend or private welfare). This is a strong version of the
double dividend provided by Goulder (1995).
We analyze whether a double-dividend is possible in an AK economy
(Rebelo (1990)). We consider revenue-neutral environmental tax reforms:
pollution taxes are increased, devoting the proceeds to cut distortionary
taxes on income, in such a way that the alternative tax systems can ﬁnance
the same path of public expenditures, perhaps through short-term deﬁcit
ﬁnancing while still allowing the government to balance its budget in the
long run.
The literature on environmental tax reform has often explored the double
dividend issue in a static framework (see e.g. Ulph (1992), Bovenberg and de
Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Parry (1995), Goulder
(1995), Parry and Bento (2000) or Proost and van Regemorter (1995)).
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997) (BM from now on) have analyzed whether
environmental ﬁscal policies can achieve a double dividend within a dynamic
model of endogenous growth (a modiﬁed Barro (1990) model). They model
the environment as a public consumption good as well as a public production
factor by incorporating the positive eﬀects of lower aggregate pollution on
the productivity of capital. They show that a double dividend may emerge
only if the environmental externality in production is powerful enough.
The major contribution of our paper is to show that, without a pollution
externality on production (that is, in a simpler model than BM’s), a strong
version of the double dividend may emerge. This result is achieved by imple-
menting the revenue-neutral tax reform by substituing environmental taxes
for income taxes in such a way that the present value of revenues ﬁnances
the present value of the predetermined path for government expenditures
(that is, public debt issuing is allowed). This strategy is not usual in the
previous literature: BM or Hettich (2000) analyze a revenue-neutral tax
reform where the pollution tax partly replaces non-environmental taxes,
assuming that the government budget is balanced every period and that
government revenues and expenditures must grow at the same rate than
2the capital stock, so that the expenditure path changes as a result of the
tax reform.
We start from an AK economy where a predetermined path for govern-
ment expenditures is ﬁnanced by distorting income taxes together with a
pollution tax. We model the environment assuming that the level of pol-
lution created by the production process enters negatively in consumers’
utility (Smulders and Gradus (1993), Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994), or
BM1, are some examples). This externality creates an opportunity for en-
vironmental corrective taxation. In addition, we assume that the pollution
ﬂow can be reduced through private abatement activities, which in turn
consume some output. In this paper we show that pollution externality
on productivity is not essential for the double dividend to arise: the pollu-
tion externality on preferences is enough to obtain double dividend if the
period-by-period government budget balance assumption is relaxed (that is,
deﬁcit-ﬁnanced green tax reforms are allowed).
We explore how a tax reform aﬀects the economy, starting from an initial
equilibrium with a non-optimal predetermined path of public expenditure
(that is, if the pollution tax rate was the only tax in the economy, revenues
from the Pigouvian tax rate would be too low to ﬁnance the predetermined
path of expenditure). Therefore, our analysis is explored in a second-best
world.
Initially, a predetermined path for government expenditures (redistributed
to households in a lump-sum fashion) is ﬁnanced by income taxes, con-
sumption taxes and the pigouvian environmental tax2. Tax reform consists
of increasing the environmental tax and decreasing the income tax so that
the present value of revenues matches the present value of expenditures. To
that end, the government is allowed to ﬁnance a certain deﬁcit in any period
t by issuing one-period pure discount bonds.
An increase in pollution tax together with a reduction in the income tax
rate could have a positive and permanent impact on the growth rate of the
economy, expanding the tax base in the following periods. If these increased
revenues allowed for the government budget constraint to hold in a present
value sense, then the tax reform would be feasible.3
We show that a double dividend arises when the elasticity of pollution
1They include environmental quality as a positive externality in the utility function.
However, environmental quality is inversely related to pollution, leading to the same
welfare function employed in our model.
2Initially the tax system consists of the pigouvian environmental tax, among others,
because we want to keep the welfare gains due to increased allocative eﬃciency apart
from those corresponding to increased tax eﬃciency.
3A dynamic Laﬀer eﬀect of this kind has been analyzed in models without pollution:
Ireland (1994), Pecorino (1995) and Novales and Ruiz (2002).
3with respect to the capital stock is not higher than the elasticity of pollution
with respect to private abatement activities. Then, pollution falls and the
growth rate of the economy increases following a green tax reform. Other-
wise, the double dividend also arises althought it lasts only a few periods
(the green dividend extingishes after some periods).
In this framework debt issuing is key to achieve a double dividend: under
the mentioned conditions, increasing the pollution tax and reducing income
and consumption tax rates to achieve the same revenues path than under
the initial tax structure, yields only a green dividend but not a blue one.
Debt issuing allows for larger reductions in distortionary taxes for any rise
in the pollution tax. Consequently, a larger increase in economic growth is
obtained, jointly with signiﬁcant environmental improvement. Therefore, a
blue dividend and a green dividend could be jointly obtained.
Two additional results are found: ﬁrst, the optimal environmental tax
will be higher than the Pigouvian level, given by the marginal social damage
from pollution. This result holds for the two types of tax reform analyzed
(with and without debt issuing). Since the environmental tax is less distor-
tionary than the income tax4, such additional welfare gain reduces the net
cost of environmental taxation, rising the optimal environmental tax above
marginal social damage.
Second, the level of public debt needed to ﬁnance a green tax reform
yielding a double dividend could be very low. In particular, this is true
when green tax reforms lead to a very large increase in the pollution tax.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the
model economy in section 2. In section 3, in a second best world, we explore
two types of revenue-neutral green tax reforms in which: i) the government
is not allowed to issue debt (we show that this green tax reform only yields
a green dividend but not a blue dividend); ii) the government is allowed
to issue debt (we show that such tax reform yields a double dividend in a
strong version). The paper ends with some conclusions.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Households
We consider an economy populated with an inﬁnitely-lived, representative
household who obtains income from capital renting. His/her utility depends
positively on consumption and negatively on aggregate pollution :
4Pollution taxes are less distortionary than alternative distortionary taxes because a







1−σ for σ>0,σ =1
lnCt − ηlnPt, for σ =1
where Ct,P t are the levels of consumption and pollution, σ is the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and η is the weight of pollution
in utility. Utility is increasing in consumption at a decreasing rate, UC > 0,
UCC < 0, and decreasing in aggregate pollution, UP < 0. If σ is higher
(lower) than 1 + 1/η, an increase in pollution leads to a reduction (an
increase) in marginal pollution desutility. This utility function is standard
in models that study the relationship between growth and pollution or the
eﬀects of green reforms given distortionary taxes.5
The household chooses the levels for Ct, Kt+1 (physical capital) and Bt+1
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where τK and τC are the tax rates on income and consumption, rt is
the return on capital. Tt are lump-sum transfers received from government,
Bt is the stock of public debt owned by the household in period t, Rt is the
interest rate on debt and δ is the rate of physical capital depreciation. The
household ignores the environmental utility externality.
2.2 Firms
Firms produce the only good in the economy using only physical capital. We
assume that the technology is linear: Yt = AKt. Environmental pollution
(Pt) is regarded as a side product of the production process. Abatement
(Zt) enables ﬁrms to increase output without causing more pollution. To
5An alternative speciﬁcation would be to consider that environmental quality, instead
of pollution, is an argument of the utility function (i.e. Boverberg and de Mooij (1997)).









, with χ1,χ 2 > 0. (3)
Firms rent capital from households at the interest rate rt and pay a
time-varying pollution tax τP,t on the level of pollution.
The ﬁrm chooses the path for Kt and Zt to maximize its proﬁts every
period (πt = Yt − rt Kt − τP,t Pt − Zt), taking as given the market price of
inputs. Without a pollution tax (τP,t = 0), ﬁrms would ignore the negative
side-eﬀect of capital in the production process and abatement activities
would be zero.
2.3 Government
The government raises taxes on consumption, income and pollution and is-
sues public debt. Income and consumption tax rates are constant, but the
tax rate on pollution grows at a rate that guarantees a constant share of
pollution tax revenues on output, (τP,t Pt)/Yt. Public revenues are redis-
tributed to households through lump-sum transfers.
The government budget constraint is:
Bt+1
Rt
+ τK rtKt + τP,t Pt + τC Ct = Tt + Bt . (4)












 =0 , (5)
which guarantees that the period by period constraints (4) can be com-
bined into a single inﬁnite horizon, present value budget constraint:
∞  
t=0












62.4 The Competitive Equilibrium and the Planner
Solution
2.4.1 The Competitive Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a set of alloca-
tions {Ct,K t+1,B t+1,Z t}
∞
t=0 and a price system {rt,R t}
∞
t=0 such that given a






:i ){Ct,B t+1,K t+1}
∞
t=0
maximizes households’ utility (1), subject to (2), and taking the pollution
level {Pt}
∞
t=0 and {K0,B 0} as given; ii) {Kt,Z t}
∞
t=0 satisﬁes the ﬁrms’ proﬁt
maximization conditions, and iii) {Ct,K t+1,Z t}
∞
t=0 satisﬁes the aggregate
resources constraint:
Kt+1 = AKt − Ct +( 1− δ) Kt − Zt. (7)
It is well known that this model lacks transitional dynamics, that is, the
competitive equilibrium takes the form of a balanced growth path.
Competitive equilibrium is characterized in appendix A, where the fol-
lowing properties of the balanced growth path are shown:















is the detrended pollution tax, which is constant along a balanced
growth path.
2. Return on capital renting:
rt = A − ξ ¯ τ
1/(1+χ2)
P , (10)





3. Market return on public debt:
Rt =( 1− τK)rt+1 +1− δ. (11)
74. Growth rate:
gM = {β [Φ(τK,¯ τP)+1− δ]}
1/(σ+(χ1−χ2)η(1−σ)) , (12)
where
Φ(τK,¯ τP)=( 1− τK)
 





and σ +(χ1 − χ2)η(1−σ) > 0 so that the growth rate depends posi-
tively on the productivity parameter, A.






= A +1− δ − gM (¯ τP,τK) − (χ2¯ τP)
1/(1+χ2). (13)
6. Pollution:













showing that if χ1 = χ2, pollution remains constant along the balanced
growth path, while if χ1 > (<)χ2 pollution will increase (decrease)
along the balanced growth path.
7. Government tax revenues6
Ψt = τK rtKt + τP,t Pt + τC Ct
= K0 · Ψ(τK, ¯ τP,τ C) · [gM (τK, ¯ τP)]
t, (15)
where,

























are the detrended tax revenues.
These equations allow us to preview the eﬀects on the economy of
changes in the diﬀerent tax rates.
6The ﬁnal equation has been obtained by substitution of the interest rate rt (10) and
the level of pollution Pt (3).
8First, a higher detrended pollution tax rate reduces the after-tax marginal
product of capital (see equation 10) and hence the incentive to invest, while
enhancing the abatement activities by the ﬁrms. As a consequence, the
abatement/capital ratio increases (see 8) and the growth rate decreases (12),
the response of the consumption/capital ratio being indeterminate (13).
Second, a higher income tax rate has a similar eﬀect on investment.
Higher income tax stimulates consumption relative to investment, while
not aﬀecting the abatement to capital ratio. As a consequence, the growth
rate decreases and the consumption/capital ratio increases.
Finally, the consumption tax does not aﬀect investment since the after-
tax marginal product of capital is unaﬀected. It does not aﬀect the abate-
ment activities of the ﬁrms either. Finally, it does not alter the consump-
tion/capital ratio as long as consumption tax revenues are distributed as
a lump-sum to households. Consequently, the consumption tax acts as a
lump-sum tax that does not aﬀect the intratemporal or the intertemporal
allocation of resources.
2.4.2 The Planner Solution
Deﬁnition 2 The central planner equilibrium is a set of allocations {Ct,
Kt+1,Z t}∞
t=0 that maximizes the lifetime utility of households, subject to the
aggregate constraint of resources (7) and the pollution equation (3).
The rate of growth for the planner solution along the balanced growth
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σ+(χ1−χ2)η(1−σ)
,( 1 7 )
















A +1− δ −
ηχ1
1+ηχ2




which depends on parameters A,δ,χ1,χ 2,ηand σ.










2.4.3 First-best ﬁscal policy
The ﬁrst-best ﬁscal policy allows for the eﬃcient path to be attained as a
competitive equilibrium. Therefore, in order to characterize the ﬁrst-best
tax policy, we compare the growth rate, consumption to capital ratio and
abatement to capital ratio for the market solution with those for the central
planner solution.
Proposition 3 The ﬁrst-best ﬁscal policy is deﬁned by an income tax rate
equal to zero (τ∗
K =0 ), any value of the consumption tax rate and a pigou-



















Proof. See Appendix B.
3 Revenue-neutral green tax reform
In this section, we explore the consequences of several tax reforms, all of
them ﬁnancing an exogenously predetermined path of public expenditures.
Such spending requirements are supposed to be higher than the revenues
raised by the pollution tax rate ﬁxed at the Pigouvian level. That way,
additional taxes are needed for expenditure ﬁnancing.
In endogenous growth models, two diﬀerent types of reforms allow for
ﬁnancing a predetermined public expenditure path:
• An increase in the pollution tax, devoting the increased revenues to
ﬁnance reductions in income and consumption tax rates so that the
new policy raises exactly the same revenues than the initial tax system.
This is the case, not only at the time of the reform but also in the
followings periods. In this case, the goverment budget is balanced
every period and consequently Bt =0f o ra l lt,e v e na f t e rt h et a x
reform.
10• Increasing the environmental tax and decreasing the capital income
tax so that the present value of revenues allows for ﬁnancing the
present value of predetermined public expenditures. In this case, the
government is allowed to ﬁnance a certain deﬁcit in any period t by
issuing one-period pure discount bonds.
Both of them are ’green reforms’ because the abatement activities are
enhanced by a higher pollution tax. They are revenue-neutral because the
new tax mix ﬁnances the same path of public expenditures. The analysis
that we carry out departs from Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997)’s who only
consider green tax reforms under which government revenues and expendi-
tures grow at the same rate than the capital stock. That is, their public
expenditure path changes as the economy growth rate is altered by the tax
reform.
Consider, as a benchmark, a situation in which the predetermined path
of public expenditures is ﬁnanced through the pollution tax rate ﬁxed at the
detrended pigouvian level ¯ τ∗
P, a positive consumption tax rate (τC,0 > 0) and
a positive income tax rate (τK,0 > 0). Therefore, the government budget
constraint previous to the tax reform is:




t Pt + τC,0 Ct
= K0 · Ψ(τK,0,τC,0,¯ τ
∗
P) · [gM,0(τK,0,¯ τ
∗
P)]
t, for t =1 ,2,3,... (22)
We explore the eﬀects of both reforms assuming that the initial tax
system includes a Pigouvian environmental tax, because we want to keep
the welfare gains due to increased eﬃciency in the allocation of resources
apart from those corresponding to increased tax eﬃciency.
If pollution falls and non-environmental welfare (that due to consump-
tion) rises as a consequence of the reform, then a double dividend is ob-
tained. In section 3.1 we show that the ﬁrst type of green tax reform only
achieves the green dividend. In section 3.2 we show that when debt issuing
is allowed, the green tax reform yields a double dividend. We also discuss
whether, in our second-best world, the optimal pollution tax deviates from
the Pigouvian tax.
3.1 Balanced budget green tax reform
Let us ﬁrst consider a green tax reform that keeps the whole revenue path
constant so that the predetermined public expenditure path is exactly ﬁ-
nanced and the government budget is balanced every period.
Fern´ andez, P´ erez and Ruiz (2002) show in an AK m o d e lw i t hap o l -
lution externality in the utility function but without abatement, that the
11relative change in τK and τP that keeps tax revenues unchanged at the
time the policy reform takes place, also guarantees that the whole path of
tax revenues remains unaltered. On the contrary, when the pollution tax
is increased in a model with abatement activities, income and consumption
tax rates must both be adjusted to guarantee that the whole path of tax
revenues remains unaltered.
Proposition 4 Let {τK,0, ¯ τP,0,τ C,0} be the initial tax mix. Let gM,0 =
gM(τK,0, ¯ τP,0) and Ψ0 =Ψ ( τK,0, ¯ τP,0,τ C,0) be the growth rate and the
detrended tax revenues before the tax reform, respectively. Let ¯ τP,1 > ¯ τP,0
be the new detrended pollution tax rate. If capital income and consumption
tax rates are set as,
τK,1 =1−
Φ(τK,0,¯ τP,0)
A − ξ (¯ τP,1)
1/(1+χ2). (23)
τC,1 =










then, the new tax mix {τK,1,¯ τP,1,τC,1} yields the same path of public rev-
enues than the initial tax mix.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary 5 The new tax mix described in proposition 4 satisﬁes: i) τK,1 <
τK,0 and, ii) τC,1 <τ C,0 if τC,0 <
1−χ1
χ2 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Therefore, the new tax mix involves increasing the pollution tax rate
and reducing the income tax rate simultaneously, so that (23) holds. The
consumption tax rate may increase or decrease. The new tax mix guarantees
that the growth rate and the detrended tax revenues do not change.
This green tax reform does not yield double dividend as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 6 Under the green tax reform described in proposition 4, the
















Taking derivatives in (13) with respect to ¯ τP and taking into account that















Taking both derivatives together we conclude that abatement crowds-out
consumption. Since the level of consumption is lower for every period after
the reform, non-environmental welfare decreases as a result of the reform
and hence the blue dividend is not achieved.
The increase in abatement activities yields an instantaneous fall in pol-
















M < 0, ∀t.
This tax reform is welfare improving for a broad set of parameterizations
of the model economy8. Since the blue dividend is not present, welfare
improvement is only due to the reduction of pollution.
3.2 Tax reform yielding double dividend
Next we design an alternative green tax reform which ensures the same
path of public spending, a reduction in pollution and an increase in private
consumption leading to higher welfare improvements; therefore, the strong
version of the double dividend is present.
Let us suppose that the government considers a permanent increase in
the pollution tax rate jointly with a reduction in the income tax rate, while
keeping the consumption tax and the same sequence of transfers {Tt,0}
∞
t=0
unchanged. In a non-monetary economy, the government will need issuing
some debt which might hopefully be retired over time. The new, lower
income taxes will increase long-run growth, thereby expanding the tax base
and leading to higher revenues at some point. The new tax-structure is
8It is not possible to determine analytically the eﬀects of ﬁscal reform on welfare;
however, it is possible to evaluate such eﬀects numerically for speciﬁc parameter values.
The results are avalaible upon request.
13feasible if the subsequent increase in the tax base allows the government
budget constraint to hold in a present value sense (see constraint 6). That
would mean that the deﬁcit in the initial periods after the policy change
can be repaid by achieving later on a ﬁscal surplus in present value that
will allow for eventually retiring the initially issued debt, with no need to
introduce tax hikes at any point in time.
On the contrary, green tax reforms that substitute pollution tax and
debt issuing for consumption taxes, holding income taxes unchanged, are
not feasible. The reason is that consumption taxes do not aﬀect growth and
hence, the future tax base will not increase under lower consumption taxes
and debt would never be retired.
Without loss of generality, we assume K0 =1 . Consider the pollution
tax rate is ﬁxed at the detrended pigouvian level ¯ τ∗
P, a positive consump-
tion tax rate (τC,0 > 0) and a positive income tax rate (τK,0 > 0) satisfying
(22). This mix allows the government to exactly ﬁnance the predetermined
path of public expenditures. Now, consider that, at t = 0, the government
implements a new tax mix {τK,1,¯ τP,1,τC,0} with τK,1 <τ K,0 and ¯ τP,1 ≥ ¯ τ∗
P.
The new growth rate and the new detrended tax revenues are given by
gM,1 = gM(τK,1,¯ τP,1)a n dΨ 1 =Ψ ( τK,1,¯ τP,1,τC,0), respectively. The rev-
enues path (15) under the new tax structure is given by
Ψt,1 =Ψ 1(τK,1, ¯ τP,1,τ C,0) · [gM,1(τK,1, ¯ τP,1)]
t, ∀t =0 ,1,2,... .( 2 5 )
Hence, the goverment budget constraint (4) can be written as
Bt+1
R1
+Ψ t,1 =Ψ t,0 + Bt, with B0 =0 , ∀t =0 ,1,2,... .( 2 6 )
where we maintain the same expenditure path than before the tax cut
(Tt,0 =Ψ t,0 , ∀t)a n dR1 is the return on public debt after the tax reform
(11).
Using the transversality condition (5) together with the initial condition








Ψ1(τK,1, ¯ τP,1,τ C,0)








14This inequality characterizes feasible green tax reforms (a similar con-
dition is found in Ireland (1994) or Novales and Ruiz (2002)).
It is not possible to determine analytically the range of parameter values
for which (27) is satisﬁed. However, it is possible to evaluate (27) numeri-
cally when speciﬁc values are chosen for the parameters.
For our simulations, benchmark parameter values are chosen, with one
period in the model identiﬁed as one year. The detrended tax rate on pol-
lution before the reform is set at the pigouvian level (¯ τ∗
P), which is endoge-
nously determined, the income tax rate9 (τK,0) is 30% and the consumption
tax rate (τC,0)i sa s s u m e dt ob e1 0 % .
The rate of capital depreciation (δ) is set at 10%, the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ) is 1.5, and the parameters related
to pollution are η =0 .95,χ 1 = χ2 =0 .4 (so the pollution level does not
grow along the time). Additionally, A=0.217 and β=0.99 so that the after-
tax real rate of interest (R) is 4% and growth is 2% per year. Given these
parameter values, the detrended pigouvian tax (¯ τ∗
P)i s0 . 7 6 % .
We characterize the eﬀects of several feasible reforms, i.e. all of them
satisfying (27):
1) If we keep the pollution tax ﬁxed at the pigouvian level (¯ τP,0 =
¯ τP,1 =¯ τ∗
P =0.76%) and consider diﬀerent values for the new income tax,
then these reforms do not aﬀect pollution because they do not change the
abatement to capital ratio (see (8)) and pollution does not grow because we
assume that χ1 equals χ2 (see (14)). Therefore, these reforms could yield
only one dividend, increasing welfare only through an increase in private
consumption.
2) We mainly study tax reforms that increase the pollution tax above its
initial level of 0.76%, which is the pigouvian tax10. These reforms achieve
a ’green dividend’ because they increase the abatement to capital ratio and
pollution does not grow because χ1 = χ2 (see (8) and (14)). Hence, pollution
path after the reform is below the benchmark path. In the section devoted
to the sensitivity analysis, we study the green dividend when χ1  = χ2.
With regards to the blue dividend, however, the results from the tax
reform are not so straightforward. For a given increase in the pollution tax,
the higher the reduction in the income tax rate, the higher the growth rate
9Cooley and Hansen (1992) use a capital income tax rate of 50% and a labor income
tax rate of 23%. In the paper we report the results for an intermediate rate but the
sensitivity analysis for other rates is available upon request. Results remain qualitativaly
the same.
10The highest pollution tax considered is 2.77% because, as we discuss below, larger
increments of the environmental taxation would break the double dividend result under
the benchmark parameterization.
15(see (12)). This induces two opposite eﬀects on the consumption path: con-
sumption will grow at a faster rate, but its initial fall is also more important
(see (13)). Hence, the welfare eﬀects of the reform due to private consump-
tion are not obvious, and a numerical solution is needed to see whether the
green tax reform yields a blue dividend.
We only need to compute if such a reform leads to an increase in non-
environmental welfare, since environmental welfare improvement occurs for
any pollution tax above 0.76%, as explained before.
Deﬁnition 7 To measure the non-environmental welfare gain, we assume
that pollution is unaﬀected by the reform (in fact pollution falls for the
benchmark parameterization of χ1 and χ2), and we compute the change in
consumption that an individual would require each period to be as well oﬀ
under the initial situation as under the new tax structure. Let Ct,0, Pt,0 and
Yt,0 be the path of consumption, pollution and output under the initial policy,
and Ct,1 be the path of consumption under the new policy. When σ  =1 , we




























A positive value for this measure corresponds to a rise in welfare and,
consequently, a blue dividend is achieved. In these cases a double dividend
appears.
In addition, solving the model numerically for speciﬁc parameter values
is necessary to answer questions like: Will the largest cut on capital income
tax yield the largest welfare improvement?. Does any welfare-improving tax
reform yield a double dividend?
Deﬁnition 8 We measure the welfare eﬀects associated to the green tax
reform as the change in consumption that an individual would require each
period to be as well oﬀ under the initial situation as under the new tax
structure. Let Ct,0 , Pt,0 and Yt,0 be the path of consumption, pollution and
output under the initial policy, and Ct,1 and Pt,1 be the path of consumption

























The result is expressed as a percentage on output,
λCt,0
Yt,0 × 100.
16Hence, a positive value for this measure corresponds to a rise in welfare,
that could be understood as a reduction in the tax system distortion.
For a given increase in the detrended pollution tax, only a certain range
of reductions in the income tax rate allows for the condition (27) to hold,
so that the tax reform is feasible only when certain income tax cuts are
implemented. On the one hand, if the income tax cut is too low growth
might decrease as a result of the new (τK,1,¯ τP,1)-pair, and the initial deﬁcit
will not be repaid in the long term. On the other hand, if the income tax cut
is too large, the initial deﬁcit will be very large, and condition (27) might
also break, even though the increase in growth will also be remarkable.
Therefore, there exists a lowest feasible cut and a largest feasible cut in
the income tax rate, both of which guaranteing the condition (27) as an
equality. Reductions between both of them lead to a present value budget
surplus.
3.2.1 Results
Figure 1 shows all feasible (τK,1,¯ τP,1)-pairs. The top limit of the coloured
area corresponds to the lowest income tax cut, for every pollution tax rate.
The lowest limit of the area corresponds to the highest income tax cut that
yields, for every pollution tax rate, a feasible reform. The top and lowest
dark-shaded areas show the (τK,1,¯ τP,1)-pairs that yield a ’green dividend’
but do not increase welfare, that is, they are suboptimal in this second-best
world. We will name these areas ’suboptimal’. The shaded areas next to the
suboptimal ones, show the (τK,1,¯ τP,1)-pairs that yield welfare improvements
b u td on o ta c h i e v et h e’ blue dividend’, that is, welfare gains are only due
to environmental improvements. We will name these areas ’green dividend’.
The centered pale area in the graph includes the (τK,1,¯ τP,1)-pairs that yield
a double dividend. Finally the bold solid line shows, for any ¯ τP,1, the level
of τK,1 that achieves the highest possible welfare improvement.11
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
A’ double dividend’ area can be seen to arise for a wide range of green
tax reforms. Furthermore, this graph shows that the range of income tax
cuts yielding a double dividend decreases when ¯ τP,1 exceeds a threshold
(¯ τP,1 =2 .03%). The explanation for this result is as follows: the higher the
pollution tax increase, the higher the enhancement of abatement activities
11Note that the (τK,1,¯ τP,1)-pairs above the lowest limit of the ”double dividend area”
lead to government budget superavits. Therefore, feasible green tax reforms yielding
double dividend could also be found under a benchamrk with initial deﬁcit, although the
feasible income tax cuts would be lower.
17(see (8)), and the higher the necessary income tax cut to guarantee that
the reform is feasible (i.e., that (27) holds); as a result of both eﬀects,
the instantaneous fall in consumption is larger. This makes more diﬃcult
an increase of non-environmental welfare, even though such reform rises the
rate of growth. In fact, under the benchmarch parameterization, the double
dividend is only obtained for the range ¯ τP,1 ∈ (0.76%, 2.77%).
Figure 2 shows the eﬀects on welfare and growth of a revenue-neutral
green tax reform. Discontinuous lines show growth and welfare improve-
ments corresponding to the largest feasible income tax cut for any pollution
tax. Solid line shows growth and welfare improvements corresponding to
the income tax cuts which lead to the highest welfare gain for any ¯ τP,1.W e
only consider the pollution tax (¯ τP,1) range for which the double dividend
occurs.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
From the graph we conclude that:
1. The tax reform yielding the highest welfare is diﬀerent to the reform
that achieves the highest growth: relationship between growth and
welfare is not monotone. However, any tax reform leading to double
dividend increases growth.
2. Largest welfare might not arise from the highest feasible income tax
cut for a certain ¯ τP, since a higher cut in τK yields a larger consump-
tion growth, but also a larger initial fall in consumption. Hence welfare
eﬀects of the reform due to private consumption are not monotonous
to income tax cuts. For example, if pollution tax increases up to 2.46%
(from 0.76%), and the capital income tax falls to -22.33% (this is the
highest tax cut), welfare decreases. However, if the capital income tax
falls to 0%, welfare increases by 19.2%.
3. Second-best optimal pollution and income taxes are those leading to
the highest welfare improvement; under the benchmark parameter-
ization, the second-best tax mix is: (τK,1,¯ τP,1) = (3.48%, 0.96%).
Hence, the optimal pollution tax rate is higher than the Pigouvian
level (0.76%). Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997) also found this result,
although only when the pollution externality on production is power-
ful enough.
Finally, ﬁgure 3 compares the magnitude of the welfare improvement
achieved from the balanced budget tax reform, which only achieves a green
dividend, and several tax reforms described in this section that yield double
18dividend (all the reforms included in the ﬁgure have been obtained for the
same set of parameter values, debt issuing being the only diﬀerence). The
results are displayed for the range of values of ¯ τP,1 for which the double
dividend arises (under the benchmark parameterization). The line nearest
to zero represents the welfare gains for the balanced budget tax reform,
while the top line represents the largest welfare improvement obtained by
the tax reform with debt issuing (it is the same solid line displayed in ﬁgure
2).
Other curves are included in ﬁgure 3. Each line graphs the welfare im-
provement obtained by a feasible tax reform which leads to a certain level of
indebtness as a percentage of output (we refer to the maximum level of debt
along the whole debt path). The following debt/output ratios have been
considered: 25%, 50%, 100% and 150%. For example, the line corresponding
to a debt/output ratio of 25% graphs the welfare gains obtained by diﬀerent
(τK,1,τP,1)-pairs that obtain double dividend and lead to a maximum level
of indebtness of 25% of output.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
A goverment may care more about the level of deﬁcits and debt than
about consumers’ welfare. Public debt has political costs in terms of mon-
etary policy credibility, expectations of future tax hikes, and so on. Figure
3 shows that there exists a trade-oﬀ between welfare and debt. In one ex-
treme, a government could choose a high level of welfare improvement (31%,
corresponding to ¯ τP,1 =0 .761%) and a high level of debt (525% on ouput);
in the other extreme, lower welfare improvements (16%, corresponding to
¯ τP,1 =2 .76%) but also much lower levels of indebtness (1% on output).12
The more agressive the green tax reform (the higher τP,1) the lower the level
of debt. The latter policy mix could be specially interesting for developing
countries, for which a large level of debt is often highly penalized by the in-
ternational capital markets in terms of currency depreciation, high interest
rates on external debt, and so on.
3.2.2 Sensitivity analysis
We study how the double dividend area in ﬁgure 1 widens or narrows de-
pending on the values of diﬀerent parameters that have not been previously
calibrated in the literature: the weight of pollution in utility η, and the
elasticities of pollution with respect to capital χ1 and abatement, χ2. The
12The highest feasible welfare gain is 33%, which is achieved for a debt/output ratio
of 490%.
19intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ is also considered since a wide
range of calibrated values exists.
In addition, the relative levels of χ1 and χ2 are crucial to ﬁnd a ’green
dividend’. If χ1 <χ 2 then, from (14), the path of pollution decreases along
the time. After the tax reform, the level of pollution is reduced in the ﬁrst
period, the steady-state economy growth rate is increased and, hence, the
pollution level decreases at a larger rate than before the reform. Therefore
the green dividend will increase along the time. However, if χ1 >χ 2, then
the growth rate of pollution is g
χ1−χ2
M >1. After the tax reform, the level of
pollution drops in the ﬁrst period (because the reform enhances the abate-
ment to capital ratio), the steady-state growth rate increases and, hence,
pollution grows faster than before the reform. Therefore, the pollution path
starts with a lower level than before the reform, but after a ﬁnite number of
periods the level of pollution will exceed the level of pollution corresponding
to the initial tax mix. Therefore, the green dividend is achieved only for a
ﬁnite, although potentially large, number of periods.
Column 1 in table 1, shows the parameter values we have considered
in order to study the robustness of tax reforms with debt issuing, keeping
constant the remainder of benchmark parameter values. Column 2 shows
the pollution tax rate before the reforms (we assume the Pigouvian tax
rate) and column 3 shows the pollution tax rate which maximizes welfare
(i.e., the second-best optimal pollution tax rate). Fourth column shows
the environmental revenues, as a percentage of output, for the pigouvian
pollution tax rate (we will name this percentage as ’environmental revenues
share’). Finally, column 5 shows how much the government can increase
the environmental revenues share, while guaranteing a double dividend.
Analyzing the double dividend with respect to shifts in the detrended
pollution tax rate is equivalent to studying changes in the double dividend
after shifts in the environmental revenues share. Using the production func-
tion together with (9) and (3), it is simple to show that the environmental


















From table 1, we can conclude that:
1. The Pigouvian pollution tax rate (ﬁrst-best optimal):
(a) Is increasing with the weight of pollution in utility (η), the pa-
rameter of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ)a n dt h e
20elasticity of pollution with respect to capital (χ1).
• A higher level of any of these parameters leads to a higher
optimal Zt/Kt ratio (18). A larger weight of pollution in the
utility function leads to a lower desired level of aggregate
pollution and, therefore, a larger Zt/Kt ratio is necessary.
The larger the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ)t h e
lower the rate of growth of the economy and the larger the
abatement to capital ratio. A larger χ1 makes capital stock
more dirty, reducing the marginal return on capital invest-
ment (net of pollution) relative to the return on abatement
activities, and hence increasing the optimal Zt/Kt ratio.
• Consequently, a higher pollution tax is necessary in order to
enhance ﬁrms’ abatement activities.
(b) Is decreasing with the elasticity of pollution with respect to
abatement (χ2). The larger the level for χ2, the larger the clean-
ing ability of abatement activities and the lower the optimal
abatement to capital ratio.
2. The highest welfare improvement is achieved for a pollution tax rate
larger than the pigouvian. That is, the second-best pollution tax rate
is always larger than the pigouvian tax in our model. Furthermore,
this result does not depend on debt issuing, since it also arises it for
the balanced budget reform: in graph 3, the lowest line corresponds
to the reform without debt, and the maximum welfare is achieved at
¯ τP,1 =1 .56%, well above the pigouvian rate (0.76%)13.
3. Regarding the double-dividend area (column 5):
(a) Economies with a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
which leads to a smoother consumption path, have fewer chances
to implement green tax reforms leading to a double dividend
result.
(b) Economies with a higher environmental weight (larger η)i nt h e
utility function have more chances to achieve double dividend by
stablishing green reforms.
(c) With regards to the pollution technology parameters: i) On the
one hand, a more dirty productive capital, larger χ1, (this is more
often the case for developing countries), leads to a wider double
dividend area. ii) On the other hand, economies with lower χ2
13The results for the whole sensitivity analysis are available upon request.
21(abatement is not very eﬀective in lowering the pollution exter-
nality of the productive process -also a more frequent pattern for
less developed countries-) have a wider ’Double Dividend Area’.
Therefore, we ﬁnd here an interesting result: developing coun-
tries, which would obtain greater beneﬁts from the green reform,
also have more technological chances to achieve a double divi-
dend.
As a conclusion, suppose two economies with similar weights of pollution
in the utility function (η), but one of them with larger χ1,l o w e rσ and lower
χ2 (the more representative case for a developing country). This economy
has more possibilities to implement a green tax reform that yields a double
dividend. However, these countries often ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to commit on
a long lasting tax reform, because of the low institutional development and
the abrupt political changes it often drives. In addition, since χ1 >χ 2 the
green dividend arises only for a ﬁnite number of periods.
4 Conclusions
This paper has explored the eﬀects of an environmental tax reform on eco-
nomic growth, pollution and welfare in a second-best framework. In the AK
model with a negative pollution externality in utility function and abate-
ment activites, we consider two types of reforms.
The ﬁrst tax reform consists of increasing the pollution tax and lowering
the taxes on consumption and income, in a way such that public debt issuing
is not necessary to ﬁnance the predetermined path of public expenditure.
In this case, abatement activities crowds out private consumption and the
growth rate keeps constant. The reform is welfare improving but the double
dividend is not present because the non-environmental welfare decreases.
The second tax reform consists of substituing pollution tax for income
tax, in such a way that the government budget constraint holds in a present
value sense, that is allowing debt issuing. This reform guarantees the pre-
determined public expenditure path and enhances growth rate, reduces pol-
lution and increases abatement activities and private consumption. Thus,
this green tax reform yields a double dividend; i.e, not only improves envi-
ronmental quality but also boosts non-environmental welfare by stimulating
economic growth.
We show that developing countries have more possibilities to implement
green tax reforms that yield double dividend, althought these economies
often ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to commit on a long lasting tax reform, due to a
low institutional development and the abrupt political changes it drives.
22Finally, we show that in both types of reforms the second-best environ-
mental tax exceeds the pigouvian tax.
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246 Appendix A
6.1 Characterization of the market equilibrium
From the ﬁrst-order conditions for the households’ problem we obtain an




 σ  
Kt+1
Kt




= β [(1 − τK)rt+1 +1− δ],
(28)
and the equilibrium condition between interest rates on debt and pro-
ductive capital:
Rt =( 1− τK)rt+1 +1− δ. (29)
Equation (29) shows that interest rate on debt is equal to the return on
capital renting, net of income capital tax and depreciation.
First-order conditions for the ﬁrms’ maximization problem are given by:









Equation (30) shows that ﬁrms rent capital up to the point where its
marginal costs rt equals the private marginal product of capital, A, minus
the marginal pollution tax payments. Equation (31) shows that the level
of abatement activities is chosen so that its marginal costs is equal to the
marginal pollution tax payments. That marginal cost is equal to one since
we assume a one-to-one technology which allows us to transform output
into abatement activities without additional costs.
By combining (31) with (30), the equation for the real interest rate is:





















Normalizing the optimal pollution tax rule by K
1−(χ1−χ2)
t , we obtain the
















showing that the pollution tax is the only tax that enhances abatement
activities.
By substitution of (8) into (32), we obtain the market return on capital
renting (10):
rt = A − ξ ¯ τ
1/(1+χ2)





which is inversely related to the pollution tax, and unaﬀected by changes
of the other taxes in the economy.










, the equation for the market




















= A +1− δ − gM (¯ τP,τK) − (χ2¯ τP)
1/(1+χ2), (37)
26which is increasing with capital income tax, while the response of con-
sumption - capital ratio to a change of pollution tax is indetermined.
Several parameter constraints are necessary for the existence of a bal-
anced growth path. More preciselly, a negative consumption-capital ratio
and a negative growth rate must be ruled out. Parameters must also satisfy
the transversality condition.14
7 Appendix B
7.1 Proof of proposition 3
The detrended ﬁrst-best optimal pollution tax (i.e. pigouvian tax) in equa-
tion (21) is obtained by comparison of the market and the eﬃcient abate-
ment/capital ratios (equations (8) and (18) respectively). Using (9), the
equation (20) is obtained.
Substitution of the optimal pollution tax into the competitive growth
rate equation (12) and by comparison with the planner growth rate (17), the
optimal income tax rate is zero (τ∗
K =0 ). Inserting the optimal pollution
tax in the equation for (Ct/Kt)M , that is (13), and taking into account
the conditions τ∗
K =0a n dgM = gP, the identity (Ct/Kt)P =( Ct/Kt)M is
obtained. Since the consumption tax is a lump-sum tax in this setup, it does
not distort the intertemporal or intratemporal allocation of consumption
and capital accumulation. Therefore, any value of τC is optimal.￿
7.2 Proof of proposition 4
Using (23) in Φ(τK,1,¯ τP,1)=( 1− τK,1)
 




,w eg e tt h a tΦ ( τK,1,¯ τP,1)=
Φ(τK,0,¯ τP,0). So, from (12), the market growth rate remains constant (gM,1 = gM,0).
14From equations (12) and (13) we see that these requirements are fulﬁlled for:
Ct/Kt > 0: A +1− δ − gM ≥ (χ2¯ τP)
1
1+χ2 ,




Transversality condition: 0 <β g
(1−σ)(1−η(χ1−χ2))
M < 1 .




2 , we obtain:
Ψ(τK,1, ¯ τP,1,τ C,1)=τK,1
 














By substitution of (23) and (24) in (38), and using the previous result that





Ψ(τK,1, ¯ τP,1,τ C,1)=Ψ 0.
It is obvious that since the new tax mix keeps the growth rate (gM)a n dt h e
detrended tax revenues (Ψ0) unchanged, the new tax mix yields for every
period the same path of public revenues than the initial tax mix.￿
7.3 Proof of corollary
From (23), it is obvious that if ¯ τP,1 > ¯ τP,0, then τK,1 >τ K,0.
Next we prove that τC,1 <τ C,0 when τC,0 <
1−χ1
χ2 . First, note that
detrended tax revenues Ψ(.) are increasing in consumption tax rate because
the consumption tax does not aﬀect the intratemporal nor the intertemporal
allocation of resources. Second, it can be easily proved that the detrended
revenues raised by the tax mix (τK,1, ¯ τP,1,τ C,0) (with τK,1 g i v e nb y( 2 3 ) )
are larger than the revenues raised by (τK,0, ¯ τP,0,τ C,0), when τC,0 <
1−χ1
χ2
(that is, Ψ(τK,1, ¯ τP,1,τ C,0) > Ψ(τK,0, ¯ τP,0,τ C,0)):
Using (23) in (22), and taking into account that growth rate remains
constant:
























1/(1+χ2) − (¯ τP,0)
1/(1+χ2)
 
which is positive when τC,0 <
1−χ1





28Hence, the green tax reform satisﬁes Ψ(τK,1, ¯ τP,1,τ C,1)=Ψ( τK,0, ¯ τP,0,τ C,0)











0.0076 0.0106 0.0136 0.0166 0.0196 0.0226 0.0256

















Green Dividend and Welfare-improving 
Reforms (Green Dividend Area)
Green Dividend and Welfare-decreasing Reforms (Suboptimal Area)
Feasible revenue-neutral green tax reforms
Optimal Income tax for a certain Pollution Tax
Figure 1. Tax reforms yielding double-dividend
30Welfare improvement and growth for the optimal 





































































Figure 2. Welfare improvement and growth from optimal tax cuts and
largest feasible tax cuts
31Welfare improvements for different levels of public 























































Debt/Output=150% Optimal Reforms Debt/Output=0%
Figure 3. Welfare improvements for diﬀerent levels of public indebtness
after the reform (percentage on output)
32Pigouvian Second-best Ratio environmental tax Percentage Points Increment of
tax (%) pollution revenues to output (%) the Pollution Tax (revenues/output)
tax (%) for the initial pollution tax satisfying double dividend
(τP,tPt/Yt) ( X - a x i sl e n g t hi nF i g u r e1 ,% )
σ = 1.50 0.76 0.96 22 24
σ =2 .00 1.10 1.60 31 13
σ =3 .00 1.43 2.03 37 5
η =0 .50 0.34 0.64 16 22
η = 0.95 0.76 0.96 22 24
η =1 .50 1.31 1.32 27 28
χ1 =0 .10 0.73 1.13 24 20
χ1= 0.40 0.76 0.96 22 24
χ1 =0 .80 0.85 0.90 21 27
χ2 =0 .10 2.70 2.80 22 115
χ2= 0.40 0.76 0.96 22 24
χ2 =0 .80 0.19 0.29 20 9
Table 1: Sensitivity analysis of the ”Double Dividend Area”
size. We consider three values of each parameter. Benchmark parame-
terization is emphasized. Second colum shows the pigouvian tax. Third
column shows the second-best pollution tax rate. Fourth column shows the
tax revenues raised for the pollution tax ﬁxed at its pigouvian level, as a
percentage on output. Fifth column shows how much the government can
increase tax revenues collected by the pollution tax (as a percentage on
output), holding the target of double dividend.